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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
ESTATE PROPERTY. The debtor filed for Chapter 7 in
September 1999 and was enrolled in several seven year
production contracts. In October 1999, Congress passed the
Market Loss Assistance Program (MLAP) and the Disaster
Assistance Program (DAP) for 1999. Because the debtor was
enrolled in the production contracts the debtor was eligible for
and received assistance under the MLAP. The debtor also
applied for and received payments under the DAP. The
applications and payments were all made post-petition. The
trustee sought to include the payments in the bankruptcy estate,
arguing that the payments were “sufficiently rooted in the
prebankruptcy past and so little entangled in the debtor’s ability
to make a fresh start.” The trustee’s argument was based on
Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966), which included in the
bankruptcy estate an income tax refund received post-petition
for the tax year in which the petition was filed. The court noted
that the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978
included a statement that Seg l was followed as to tax refunds
but was silent as to other post-petition payments. The court
held that the post-petition assistance payments were not
included in the bankruptcy estate because, on the date of the
petition, the legislation authorizing the payments had not been
enacted. In re Vote, No. 01-2203 (8th Cir. 2002), aff’g, 261
B.R. 439 (Bankr. 8th Cir. 2001).
CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
ELIGIBILITY. The debtors had pre-bankruptcy income
from farm operations, off-farm employment and the sale of
farm land. The farm land was sold to an unrelated party to be
developed into a golf course. The debtors continued to hold
land which was used as pasture but was available for sale for
non-farm development. The debtors argued that the proceeds
from the sale of the farm land should be included in farm
income for purposes of qualifying for Chapter 12 because the
land sale was a good business decision. The debtors pointed to
In re Armstrong, 812 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1987), which allowed
the proceeds from the sale of farm machinery to be included in
farm income. The court distinguished this case from Armstrong
in that the debtors here did not make the land sale as part of a
plan to save the remaining farm as a business. Instead, the court
noted that the debtors seemed to be holding the farm only until
a neighboring developer would be willing to buy more land.
The court held that the land sale proceeds were not farm
income and the debtors were not qualified for Chapter 12. In re
Ross, 270 B.R. 710 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2001).
CHAPTER 13   -ALM § 13.03.*
CONFIRMATION OF PLAN. The debtor filed for Chapter
13 and submitted a plan which provided for payments from
income and from the sale of a farm, farm machinery and a bar
over the period of the plan. A bank had a first lien in the bar
and farm equipment and a second lien on the farm property.
The bank objected to the plan because the secured lien interest
rate and terms were modified by the plan. However, the bank
failed to timely file a claim in the case. The court held that the
debtor’s plan was not feasible because there was insufficient
incom  to fund the plan; however, the court held that, unless no
one objected to the bank’s late filed claim, the bank’s claim
would be disregarded and the amounts needed to pay the
secured claim would be applied to general unsecured creditors
and produce sufficient funds to make the plan payments. The
c urt allowed the other creditors an opportunity to object to the
untimely bank claim. In re Michels, 270 B.R. 737 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa 2001).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
POST-PETITION INTEREST. The Chapter 7 trustee did
not file or pay the bankruptcy estate’s income taxes for the four
years of the case until the last year. The IRS added penalties
and interest to the estate’s tax liability.  The estate’s taxes and
penalties were accorded administrative claim priority but the
debtor argued that the interest on the taxes was not entitled to
a ministrative claim priority. The IRS argued that the
bankruptcy statute was not clear and that Section 503(b)(1)
should be interpreted to include the interest as part of the taxes
ow d. The court held that Section 503(b)(1)(B) was clear and
provided administrative claim priority only to taxes and
penalties; therefore, the interest on the taxes was entitled only
to a fifth priority as provided by Section 726(a)(5). In re
Weinstein, 272 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2001), aff’g, 251 B.R. 174




CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE . The APHIS has issued
interim regulations under the animal health regulations to
provide for the payment of indemnity by the USDA for the
vol ntary depopulation of captive cervid herds known to be
infected with chronic wasting disease. 67 Fed. Reg. 5925 (Feb.
8, 2002).
LIVESTOCK INDEMNITY PROGRAM. The CCC has
adopted as final regulations implementing the livestock
indemnity program for 2000 for losses due to disasters or wild
fires in areas covered by a qualifying disaster declaration issued
by the President or Secretary of Agriculture.  For 2000, losses
due to anthrax are also included.  67 Fed. Reg. 7265 (Feb. 19,
2002).
MILK. The CCC has announced that the regulations
governing the Dairy Recourse Loan Program have been
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removed from the Code of Federal Regulations because the
program's authorizing legislation was repealed by Section 772
of the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug
Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
2002, Pub. L. 107-76. 67 Fed. Reg. 7056 (Feb. 15, 2002).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT .  The plaintiff had its PACA license suspended for failing
to provide documents and the plaintiff sought a stay of the
suspension pending judicial review. The USDA argued that the
court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because (1) the
petition for appeal was faxed to the USDA by the court and not
mailed, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2344 and (2) no final
administrative decision had been made. The court found that
the petition was mailed and faxed by the clerk of the court
because the anthrax incident had caused significant delays in
mail sent to governmental agencies. The court noted that it was
frivolous for the USDA to complain about the use of a faster,
more secure method of sending the petition.  The court also
found that the USDA suspension order was a final decision
because the order had a lasting and continuous effect with no
other recourse to the plaintiff but a judicial review. The USDA
also argued that a stay was not necessary because the plaintiff
was no longer in business, based on the testimony of a USDA
auditor who visited the business. The plaintiff charged the
auditor with perjury because the plaintiff had moved its
business premises and the auditor and other USDA agents had
visited the plaintiff’s new location several times before the
auditor claimed to have visited the closed business. The court
held that there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the
plaintiff was still in business and would be harmed by the
license suspension. The court granted the stay pending review
of the suspension order because the plaintiff had a good chance
of success in overturning the suspension order since (1) the
USDA did not provide any notice or hearing by an uninvolved
party, such as an administrative judge, on the matter before
suspending the license, and (2) the suspension was perpetual
instead of the for 90 days as required by statute. Fine Foods,
Inc. v. U.S.D.A., 274 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001).
TUBERCULOSIS . The APHIS has issued interim
regulations amending the regulations regarding the payment of
indemnity for animals destroyed because of bovine tuberculosis
to provide that the APHIS will pay owners of the animals an
indemnity equal to the difference between the net salvage
received and the appraised value of the animals destroyed, up
to $3,000 per animal. 67 Fed. Reg. 7583 (Feb. 20, 2002).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAX
VALUATION OF STOCK . The decedent’s estate included
stock in a closely-held corporation. The stock was preferred
stock subject to a redemption agreement at over $1,000 per
share plus interest if the redemption occurred after specified
dates. The estate valued the stock at book value, $10 per share,
but the stock was redeemed under the redemption agreement a
year after the decedent’s death at $1,000 plus interest. The Tax
Court held that the redemption was relevant to the value of the
stock at the decedent’s date of death because the redemption
was foreseeable and the corporation had sufficient funds to
make the redemption on the date of the decedent’s death. The
Tax Court, however, allowed a 4 percent discount to the value
of the stock as a “reasonable discount” for a potential
purchaser. The appellate court remanded the case on this issue
for the Tax Court to provide an explanation for the choice of a
4 percent valuation discount. Estate of Trompeter v.
Comm’r, 2002-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,428 (9th Cir.
2002), rev’g and rem’g, T.C. Memo. 1998-35.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BUSINESS EXPENSES. The IRS has announced its
acquiescence in the following case. The taxpayer was a
corporation which owned a jet. The corporation allowed its
corporate officers to use the jet for personal purposes. The
officers included the value of the use of the jet in their gross
income and the taxpayer claimed the expenses for maintaining
and using the jet as business deductions. The IRS argued that,
under I.R.C. § 274(a)(1), the business deductions were not
allowed because the aircraft was a facility used for
ent rtainment. Thus, the taxpayer would be allowed a
d duction only for the amounts determined to be deductible as
compensation to the officers. The taxpayer argued that I.R.C. §
274(e)(2) provided an exception to section 274(a)(1) because
the officers included the value of the flights as compensation.
The court agreed with the taxpayer and allowed the deductions
for the maintenance and use of the jet. Sutherland Lumber-
Southwest, Inc. v. Comm’r, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,503 (8th Cir. 2001), acq., AOD/CC-2002-02.
The taxpayer owned a multiple unit residential rental property
and claimed deductions related to the operation of the property,
The court allowed the deductions to the extent the taxpayer
provided written and other evidence to substantiate the
expenses and disallowed all deduction for unsubstantiated
expenses. Shelton v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2002-9.
CAPITAL EXPENSES . The IRS has issued guidance that
impact fees incurred by real property developers in connection
with the construction of a new residential rental building are
indirect costs that, pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 263(a), 263A, should
be capitalized and added to the basis of buildings constructed.
Accordingly, developers and operators of low-income housing
may include such fees in the computation of the low-income
housing credit. Rev. Rul. 2002-9, I.R.B. 2002-10.
CORPORATIONS-ALM § 4.02[14].*
GOLDEN PARACHUTE PAYMENTS. The IRS has issued
proposed regulations relating to golden parachute payments
under I.R.C. § 280G, effective for payments that are contingent
on a change in ownership or control occurring on or after
January 1, 2004. Taxpayers may rely on regulations proposed
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on May 5, 1989, for any payment contingent on a change in
ownership or control that occurs prior to January 1, 2004. Rev.
Proc. 2002-13, I.R.B. 2002-__.
SHAM CORPORATIONS. The taxpayer was an accountant
who had established 13 corporations through which the
taxpayer funneled much of the taxpayer’s income which was
not reported on the taxpayer’s income tax returns. The court
held that the corporations were shams and would be
disregarded for income tax purposes because (1) the taxpayer
used false EINs when forming the corporations; (2) the 13
corporations did not follow any corporate formalities such as
maintaining books and records, issuing stock, holding annual
meetings, electing officers, or issuing financial statements; (3)
the corporations did not have employees, paid no salaries or
dividends, did not conduct any legitimate business, and did not
file tax returns; (4) the taxpayer did not treat the 13
corporations as separate business entities; and (5) the taxpayer
often lent money from one corporate account and deposited
repayments for that loan in other corporate accounts. W pnick
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2002-45.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14]. The taxpayer had filed a sexual harassment suit
against an employer and received a judgment for back pay,
front pay, pension benefits, attorneys’ fees and court costs.
Under the taxpayer’s legal fee arrangement with the taxpayer’s
lawyers, about one-half of the award was paid to the taxpayer’s
attorneys. The court held that all of the judgment was included
in the taxpayer’s income because none of the award was for
personal injuries. The taxpayer could not exclude the attorneys’
fees from income, because the attorneys did not have a property
interest in the fee portion of the award. The taxpayer, however,
could claim the fees as a miscellaneous deduction. Hukkanen-
Campbell v. Comm’r, 274 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2001), aff’g,
T.C. Memo. 2000-180.
DISASTER PAYMENTS . On February 6, 2002, the
President determined that certain areas in Kansas were eligible
for assistance under the Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a result of a severe ice
storm on January 29, 2002. FEMA-1402-DR. On February 6,
2002, the President determined that certain areas in Missouri
were eligible for assistance under the Act as a result of severe
ice storms on January 29, 2002. FEMA-1403-DR. On January
24, 2002, the President determined that certain areas in
Arkansas were eligible for assistance under the Act as a result
of severe storms and flooding on December 15, 2001. FEMA-
1400-DR. On February 1, 2002, the President determined that
certain areas in Oklahoma were eligible for assistance under the
Act as a result of severe ice storms on January 30, 2002.
FEMA-1401-DR. Accordingly, a taxpayer who sustained a
loss attributable to the disasters may deduct the loss on his or
her 2001 federal income tax return.
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS. The IRS has announced that,
consistent with prior practice, the IRS will not assert that any
taxpayer has understated a federal tax liability by reason of the
receipt or personal use of frequent flyer miles or other in-kind
promotional benefits attributable to the taxpayer's business or
official travel. However, the IRS also stated that any future
guidance on the taxability of these benefits will be applied
prospectively. The IRS also stated that this relief did not apply
to travel or other promotional benefits that are converted to
cash, to compensation that is paid in the form of travel or other
promotional benefits, or in other circumstances where these
benefits are used for tax avoidance purposes. Ann. 2002-18,
I.R.B. 2002-__.
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSION . The taxpayer was a
wood roducts manufacturer which owned timber forests. Some
of the timber was damaged by storms, fires and insects. The
plaintiff alvaged the damaged trees by removing them and
processing them into wood products. The plaintiff sought to
d fer, under I.R.C. § 1033, only that portion of the gain
attributable to the difference between its basis and the fair
market value of the damaged trees as of the time its salvage of
them began; that is, the value the taxpayer contended would
ave been recognized if it had sold the damaged trees on the
open market instead of further processing and/or milling the
damaged trees into finished products. The IRS argued that no
involuntary conversion occurred because the trees were
processed the same as undamaged trees. The court held that the
taxpayer was eligible for the Section 1033 deferral because the
taxpayer was forced to harvest, salvage and process the trees
before the normal time. The court stated that the taxpayer’s
situation was indistinguishable from the circumstances set forth
in Rev. Rul. 80-175, 1980-2 C.B. 230, where the taxpayer's
trees were felled by a hurricane. The court held that the fact that
the damage was sufficiently partial so as to result in a
substantial amount of deferral was not a reason, under the
statute, to deny relief. Willamette Industries, Inc. v. Comm’r,
118 T.C. No. 7 (2002).
LEGAL FEES . The taxpayer corporation claimed a
deduction for legal fees paid for the criminal defense of the
corporation’s sole shareholder who was charged with
conspiracy to evade the taxes owed by another taxpayer. The
court held that the legal fees were not deductible because the
legal fees were not paid for the protection of the corporation or
paid for matters relating to the business of the corporation.
Capital Video Corp. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2002-40.
RETURNS. The IRS has announced that errors related to a
new line on the basic income tax forms may delay refunds by a
week or more for taxpayers filing incorrect returns. A credit is
claimed on line 47 of Form 1040, line 30 of Form 1040A and
line 7 of Form 1040EZ. The credit is for taxpayers who did not
get the maximum benefit from the 2001 advance payments, and
whose 2001 income or tax amounts qualify them for an
additional amount. Taxpayers who received the limit for their
filing status should leave this credit line blank. The maximum
amounts are: $300 for a single person or a married person filing
separately; $500 for a head of household; and $600 for a
married couple filing jointly or a qualifying widow or widower.
The main errors taxpayers make on the rate reduction credit
line are: entering the advance payment amount, when the line
should be blank because the taxpayer has already received the
maximum benefit; entering a credit amount, when the line
should be blank because the taxpayer is a dependent; leaving
the line blank, when the taxpayer actually qualifies for the
credit; or figuring the credit amount incorrectly. The IRS is
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advising taxpayers that, if an error related to this credit has
been made, the taxpayer should not file an amended return until
after the IRS processes the original return. The IRS is rejecting
e-filed returns that show the advance payment amount on this
line or that show a dependent claiming the credit, so that the
taxpayer or return preparer may quickly fix the problem and
transmit a corrected return. IR-2002-19.




AFR 2.69 2.67 2.66 2.66
110 percent AFR 2.96 2.94 2.93 2.92
120 percent AFR 3.23 3.20 3.19 3.18
Mid-term
AFR 4.52 4.47 4.45 4.43
110 percent AFR 4.98 4.92 4.89 4.87
120 percent AFR 5.43 5.36 5.32 5.30
Long-term
AFR 5.48 5.41 5.37 5.35
110 percent AFR 6.04 5.95 5.91 5.88
120 percent AFR 6.60 6.49 6.44 6.40
Rev. Rul. 2002-10, I.R.B. 2002-__.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME . The taxpayers, husband
and wife, retired from farming in 1988 and entered into a rental
agreement with their sons to farm the property with the
taxpayers and sons sharing profits and expenses equally. The
taxpayers became members of a local agricultural cooperative
by purchasing common stock in the cooperative and entering
into production and marketing agreements with the
cooperative. The agreements required the taxpayers to either
deliver a certain amount of corn each year or to purchase corn
from the cooperative pool of excess corn as a substitute. In
return for petitioners' meeting their production and delivery
obligations, the cooperative was obligated under the agreement
to pay the taxpayers: (1) at least 80 percent of the loan value
per bushel of corn delivered by each petitioner; (2) a storage
fee and interest in some cases; (3) an additional payment
(“value-added payment”) for value added to the corn as a result
of its processing and as further compensation for corn delivered
by the taxpayers, if the cooperative determined that such a
payment was warranted after calculating the net proceeds from
all of its operations for the processing year and if the
cooperative's lenders approved; and (4) payments from the
cooperative's earnings as patronage dividends in accordance
with the cooperative‘s bylaws. The taxpayers reported the
value-added payments as capital gain income, which was not
included in self-employment income. The IRS argued that the
value-added payments were income from a trade or business
and were liable for self-employment taxes. The taxpayers
argued that the value-added payments were either investment
income attributed to their common stock ownership or
dividends from the stock, neither of which were self-
employment income. Initially, the parties agreed that the rental
of the farm to the sons was not a trade or business and the
income from the farm was not self-employment income. The
IRS argued that the taxpayers’ involvement with the
cooperative was sufficient to qualify as a trade or business in
that the cooperative’s actions as agents for the taxpayers could
be attributed to the taxpayers. The court held that the
cooperative did not function as the taxpayers’ agent and that
th  taxpayers, although retired from active farming, continued
to be act ve in dealing in corn through the cooperative. The
court also noted that the cooperative form of business did not
cr ate an agency relationship with the members. The court held
that the value-added payments resulted from the business of the
taxpayers of acquiring and selling corn. The court also held that
the exclusions of I.R.C. § 1402(a)(2) (dividends) or 1402(a)(3)
(capital assets) did not apply to exclude the income from self-
employment tax. Bot v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. No. 8 (2002).
TAX SHELTERS. The taxpayer, an orthopedic surgeon,
invested in a partnership which developed and operated jojoba
farms. The taxpayer claimed tax losses more than double the
initial investment in the first tax year and additional losses in
following years. The losses were disallowed because the
partnership was held to be a sham tax shelter. The issues in this
case were whether the taxpayer was liable for the negligence
component of the accuracy-related penalty and whether the IRS
should have waived the understatement of tax component  of
the accuracy-related penalty. The court ruled that it was
unreasonable for the taxpayer to not have sought expert tax
a vice before claiming substantial and accelerated tax losses
more than double the initial investment. The taxpayer also
failed to provide any substantial authority for their claim of
losses. Welch v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2002-39.
TRAVEL EXPENSES . The taxpayer claimed travel
expenses for travel between the taxpayer’s parents’ home in
Wisconsin and Chicago where the taxpayer performed with a
band or traveled to other cities to perform with that band. The
court held that the taxpayer’s city of residence was Chicago
because the taxpayer spent more time there and lived in
Wisconsin only part time to save money. The taxpayer was
allowed travel expense deductions for costs incurred while
traveling with the band outside of Chicago. Bjornstad v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2002-47.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
DAIRY COW. The plaintiff purchased 115 diary cows from
the defendant. Under Wash. Stat. § 16-86-015, the cows were
required to be tested for brucellosis within 30 days of transfer.
The cows were tested before delivery and one cow tested
“suspect” for brucellosis twice and was slaughtered. The
carcass, however, was tested as free of infection. The remaining
cows were delivered more than 30 days later and were re-tested
as required by the statute. Again, one cow tested as a reactor
and was slaughtered, with the carcass testing as free of
infection. The herd was quarantined for four months until the
carcass was tested as infection free. The plaintiff sued the
defendant for negligence, breach of the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose, strict liability and violation of
the Consumer Protection Act. The defendant sought to dismiss
the claims in tort as barred by the economic loss rule which
allows only contract actions involving losses resulting from
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commercial agreements or contracts. The court held that claims
in tort were prohibited if the losses arose out of transactions
bargained for by commercial parties. The court held that the
negligence and strict liability claims were properly dismissed
by the trial court because the brucellosis testing was part of the
commercial transaction and the damages, if any, were caused
by the testing of the cows and not the cows themselves.
Hofstee v. Dow, 36 P.3d 1073 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PRIORITY. The debtor granted the plaintiff credit union a
security interest in all cattle owned by the debtor, including
after-acquired cattle. The cattle were pastured on land owned
by one of the defendants. The debtor and the landowner agreed
to allow the debtor to pasture the cattle free in exchange for the
debtor’s caring for the landowner’s cattle on the same land. The
debtor defaulted on the credit union loan and the cattle were
sold, with the proceeds placed with the court until the priority
of the interests of the various parties was determined. The
landowner claimed an agister’s lien for the value of the use of
the pasture land. The court found that the landowner lived 300
miles from the pasture and did not ever take possession or
control of the cattle nor did the landowner enter into any
contract with the debtor for the care of the debtor’s cattle. The
court held that the landowner did not have an agister’s lien or
any other interest in the cattle. Another defendant had entered
into a sales contract with the debtor to sell cattle to the debtor.
The contract provided for installment payments to be made
from the sales of the cattle. The defendant claimed that the
transaction was a lease because the defendant retained the
brand on the cattle. The court found that the parties had
characterized the transaction as a sale and that the cattle carried
brands of third parties; therefore, the transaction was a sale and
the defendant had only an unperfected security interest in the
cattle sold to the debtor. The defendant also argued that the
defendant should recover at least the unpaid portion of the
contract under equitable principles because the credit union
would unjustly benefit from its security interest in the after-
acquired cattle. The court acknowledged that equitable
doctrines have been used to overcome the priority of security
interest in the UCC, but held that the defendant had not
demonstrated any sufficient equitable doctrine to overcome the
credit union’s perfect security interest in after-acquired
property. Daniels-Sheridan v. Bellanger, 36 P.3d 397 (Mont.
2001).
TRESPASS
TIMBER . The defendant was hired to cut timber on land
neighboring the plaintiff’s land. One of the defendant’s
employees incorrectly determined the boundaries of the
neighbor’s land and included all of the plaintiff’s timber in the
imber to be cut. Although the defendant admitted cutting the
wrong trees, the parties did not agree as to the value of the
timber cut. After a jury trial, the jury determined that the
efendant willfully and intentionally cut the trees with the
intent to deprive the plaintiff of the plaintiff’s property and
determined the value of the trees cut. Because of this finding by
the jury, the court trebled the damages as provided by state law.
The defendant argued that the opinion of an expert witness as
to the intent of the boundary marker employee was improperly
ruled inadmissable. The court held that the jury had sufficient
evidence to make that determination without the expert’s
testimony.  The court noted that the employee testified that the
boundary was marked without any use of a survey or
measuring devices, either of which would have shown that the
bou dary was too large. The defendant also argued that the
damage award was excessive because it exceeded the
difference in the fair market value of the land before and after
th  cutting. The defendant noted that the damage award, before
trebling, exceeded what the plaintiff paid for the land just two
ye rs before the cutting. The court upheld the damage award
because the award was based on the appraisals provided by
s veral experts and because the defendant failed to show how
th  fair market value of the land affected the value of the trees.
Auger Timber Co. v. Jiles, 56 S.W.3d 386 (Ark. Ct. App.
2001).
IN THE NEWS
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES. CCH reported on a seminar
held February 20 in Washington, D.C. titled “Current Issues
Und r Section 1031: Tenants in Common and Undivided
Fractional Interests.” At the seminar, Deborah Harrington,
ttorney-advisor in the Treasury Department's Office of Tax
Legislative Counsel said that the IRS will be providing
guida ce as to when a co-tenancy is not a partnership for
purposes of the like-kind exchange rules. The IRS plans to
allow taxpayers to request rulings as to whether a co-ownership
interest is a partnership or not. CCH NEWS-FEDERAL,
2002TAXDAY, 02/22/2002, Item #I.3.
NUISANCE. Lawyers Weekly has reported that a judge in
Sioux County, Iowa District Court has awarded $100,000 for
loss of value in a homestead after a corporate hog farm was
built nearby. The plaintiffs had alleged that the company's
4,000-head hog farm near their home was a nuisance that
attracted bugs and harmed their emotional and physical health.
They had sought punitive and compensatory damages, as well
as an injunction that could halt their farm's operations. The
judge denied the injunction "since the award here made will
adequately compensate the plaintiffs."  The judge had
previously ruled that the Iowa right-to-farm law was
unconstitutional because large farms could interfere with the
use of a neighboring property and right to seek compensation.
2002 LWUSA 150 (Feb. 18, 2002).
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PRINCIPLES OF AGRICULTURAL LAW
by Roger McEowen & Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf textbook is ideal for instructors, attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who teach agricultural law courses in law schools or at the junior college or university levels.
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Updates are published every August and December to keep the Principles current with the latest developments and are
available at $45 per year.
For your copy, send a check for $100 to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients.  The book contains over 900 pages and an index. The Manual is
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1:  Farm and Ranch Liability
Chapter 2:  Environmental Law Relating to Farms
and Ranches
Chapter 3:  Agricultural Labor
Chapter 4:  Income Tax and Social Security
Chapter 5:  Estate Planning: Death-Time Transfers
Chapter 6:  Gifts and Federal Gift Tax, Installment Sales
and Private Annuities
Chapter 7:  Organizing the Farm or Ranch Business
Chapter 8:  Life Estates and Trusts
Chapter 9:   Governmental Regulation of Animal
 Production, Shipment and Sale
Chapter 10:  Governmental Regulation of Crop Production,
 Shipment and Sale
Chapter 11:  Government Regulation of Agricultural Inputs
Chapter 12:  Government Regulation of Foreign Trade
Chapter 13:  Commercial Law Applicable to Farms
and Ranches
Chapter 14:  Agricultural Cooperatives
Index
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra charge updates
published within five months after purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep the Manual current with the
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